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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Race-Conscious Relief after Paradise:
Reconciling Strict Scrutiny with a District Court's Equitable Discretion. United States v. Paradise,107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987).
In 1972, a federal district court found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) had "engaged in a blatant and
continuous pattern and practice of discrimination [which was]... unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 1 Relying on
its equitable remedy power, the district court ordered the Department
to hire one black trooper for every white trooper hired until 25% of
the state trooper force was black.2 The district court also enjoined the
Department from discriminating in promotion.' After ruling in 1975
that the Department had artificially restricted the size of the trooper
force, the district court enjoined it from further efforts to delay or frustrate full compliance with the 1972 order. 4 Since then, the Department
has complied with that order, and blacks now make up roughly 25%
of the trooper force.6
In 1977, the plaintiffs in the earlier action, including the Justice
Department and Phillip Paradise, Jr., challenged the Department's promotion procedures.6 At that time, none of the 232 troopers at the rank
of corporal or above was black.' In a 1979 Consent Decree, the Department pledged to develop within one year a promotion procedure that
would have "little or no adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal."I The Department agreed that the parties would measure adverse impact by applying the "four-fifths rule" of the 1978
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 9 Under that
rule, the percentage of blacks selected for promotion under a given
procedure must equal four-fifths of the percentage of whites selected. 0
1. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'4 493 F.2d 614 (Sth
Cir. 1974) (The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People brought the
original suit; the United States was joined as a party plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr. intervened on behalf of a class of black plaintiffs).
2. Blacks made up 25 percent of the relevant labor force. United States v. Paradise,
107 S. Ct. 1053, 1071 (1987) (citing Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 n.2 (M.D. Ala.
1983)).

3. Allen, 340 F. Supp. at 706.

4. Paradise,107 S.Ct. at 1060 (citing Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 1975)).
5. Brief for Petitioner at 3, United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (No. 85-999).
6. Paradise,107 S.Ct. at 1059. The 1972 order applied not only to entry-level positions, but to all trooper ranks. Id at 1060 (citing Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439,
440 (M.D. Ala. 1979)).
7. 1d at 1060 (citing Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. at 442)).
8. Id Under a separate agreement, the Department agreed to promote at least three
blacks to corporal in the interim. Id n.9.
9. Id at 1060 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.14, pt. 1, § 4 (1978)).
10. For example, if 10 of 20 white applicants (or 50%) are promoted under a given procedure, 4 of 10 black applicants (or 40%) must be promoted to avoid adverse impact. See Paradise, 107 S.Ct. at 1061 n.10.
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The Consent Decree also provided that the plaintiffs could later apply to
the court either to enforce the decree's terms or for other appropriate
relief.'
In 1981, the Department sought approval of a promotion procedure
consisting mainly of a written test.12 Under a second consent decree, the
parties agreed to administer and then review the procedure to determine
whether it adversely impacted black applicants. 3 The Department administered the test to 262 applicants, 60 of whom were black. Only five blacks
were listed in the top half, the highest being 80th. Thus, whites would
have received the first seventy-nine promotions under the test. 4 In April
1983, the plaintiff class moved the district court to review the test for
adverse impact and to enforce the terms of the two consent decrees.
In October 1983, the district court held the procedure had an adverse
impact on blacks.' 6 The court then asked the parties to present alternatives.' 7 The plaintiff class sought an order requiring the Department to
promote one black for each white promoted to corporal until it implemented a valid promotion procedure.' 8 The Department, while requesting more time to develop a nondiscriminatory procedure, proposed an
immediate promotion of four blacks and eleven whites to corporal.'
In December 1983, the district court ordered the Department to promote, as long as qualified blacks were available, one black for each white
promoted. The order was to last until either the Department had developed and implemented an acceptable promotion plan or blacks made up
25% of each rank (matching the percentage of blacks in the labor force)."
The order has been applied once, in February 1984 when the Department
promoted eight blacks and eight whites to corporal." The district court
suspended it four months later after the Department submitted an acceptable promotion procedure for that rank. 2 The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order in 1985.21
11. Id. at 1060.

12. Id. at 1061. The procedure consisted of four factors, weighted as follows: written

test, 60%; supervisory evaluation, 20%; length of service, 10%; service ratings, 10%. Differences in seniority could only account for a three percent difference between applicant scores.
Brief for Respondent at 9, United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (No. 85-999).
13. Paradis 107 S. Ct. at 1061.

14. Id.

15.
16.
17.
85-999).
18.

Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 171, 174 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
Brief for Respondent at 29, United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (No.
Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1061.

19. Id at 1062.

20. Id (citing Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 (M.D. Ala. 1983)).

21. Id at 1063.

22. Id The district court later suspended the order when the Department timely sub-

mitted promotion procedures for the rank of sergeant which did not appear to have adverse
impact. Id at 1063-64. The district court also allowed the Department to promote only whites
to lieutenant and captain because no blacks qualified for those positions. Id at 1064 n.14.
23. Id at 1064 (citing Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985)-
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The United States Department of Justice challenged this order as2 a4
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The United States argued that the Constitution required the district court
either to fine the Department for non-compliance or to adopt the Depart25
ment's own proposal before it ordered the one-for-one promotion quota.
United States v. Paradise6 thus presented the issue of under what circumstances a district court could order race-conscious relief without denying equal protection to non-minority employees.2 7 The Supreme Court
affirmed the order as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose.2 8 However, by failing to reconcile strict scrutiny with a district court's equitable discretion, the plurality left open the question of
whether a district court may order race-conscious relief only as a last
2
This casenote will examine the Court's contradictory signals on
resort."
this issue and suggest a solution to the conflict.3 0
BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court first recognized that district courts have broad
discretion to fashion race-conscious relief.3 1 However, with Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 2 the Court began narrowing the circumstances in which other parties, such as universities or school boards,
can conduct race-conscious affirmative action. The Court later restricted
the district courts' ability to order such remedies as well."3
In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,"'the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause permits
district courts wide discretion in enforcing the school desegregation deci24. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1064. The United States was a party plaintiff throughout
the litigation. See supra note 1. It did not oppose the plaintiff class until the latter proposed
a one-to-one promotion quota. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1061.
25. Brief for Appellant at 20, United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (No.
85-999).
26. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
27. Id at 1057.
28. Id at 1064.
29. In Paradise,the plurality noted that the Court had not always required race-conscious
remedies to be the least restrictive means of implementation. Id at 1073. However, it also
considered whether the order was necessary and held that the district court had no other
effective remedy. Id at 1070. Thus, the plurality's analysis undercuts their suggestion that
a district court need not wait until the last resort.
30. Several recent cases involve purely statutory (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) challenges to race-conscious remedies. See, e.g., United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). The Supreme Court has also heard several
mixed statutory and constitutional challenges to race-conscious remedies. See, e.g., Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). This casenote
will focus on the equal protection cases and the equal protection portions of hybrid cases
because Title VII analysis, while similar, is not identical to equal protection analysis. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1075 n.] (Powell, J., concurring).
31. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (5-4 decision) (With only Justice Powell in both majorities, the
Court invalidated the affirmative action program at issue, but also held that universities
may consider race in admitting candidates to medical school).
33. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3019.
34. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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sions."1 The Court stated that: "Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." In that case, the board of education administered a dual school
systems' and failed to present a desegregation plan. The district court ordered the board to seek a 71%-29% ratio of whites and blacks in its
schools. 8 The Court held the use of mathematical ratios was within the
equitable remedial discretion of the district court.39
However, Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke'0 yielded two
distinct but more rigorous standards of constitutional review for raceconscious remedies. In that case, the Court invalidated an affirmative action program initiated by the University of California which each year
reserved to Negro, Chicano, and Asian applicants sixteen of one hundred
42
seats in medical school.' Five justices reached the equal protection issue.
Justice Powell treated the program as a suspect classification and thus
required the remedy to be a necessary means of advancing a compelling
governmental purpose.43 In contrast, four justices concluded raceconscious remedies were valid if substantially related to important governmental objectives." Emphasizing that the program totally excluded nonminorities from a certain percentage of seats, Justice Powell concluded
the quote was unnecessary to the school's compelling interest in a diverse
student body.4 5 However, the Court also held that the equal protection
46
clause allows schools to consider race as part of the admissions process.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, "7 the Court upheld the "minority business
enterprise" provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.6 Unless waived, that provision required that at least 10% of federal funds
35. Id. at 25. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I), the

Court held public school segregation unconstitutional. In Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (Brown II), the Court authorized district courts to use their traditional equity powers in eliminating segregated public schools.
36. Swan, 402 U.S. at 15.
37. In a "dual school system," the student assignment patterns, the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities reveals the existence of "white schools" and "Negro schools." Id at 19.
38. Id at 9 n.4.

39. Id at 25. The Court also suggested a possible standard of review in concluding the
relief ordered was reasonable, feasible, and workable. Id. at 31.
40. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41. Id at 275-76. These applicants could also compete for the balance of seats. Id
42. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concluded Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited the affirmative action program. Id at 409 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 305.
44. 1d. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun support such a standard today. Wygant v. Jackson

Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20. Justice Powell assumed the university had a compelling interest in improving the delivery of health care services to minorities. However, he
found little evidence the quota served this goal. Id at 311.
46. Id at 320. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII does not prohibit
all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
47. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
48. Id at 492 (citing Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982)).
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granted for local public works projects be used to procure services or supplies from minority businesses. 4 The plurality suggested that Congress
had broader discretion than the federal courts to create race-conscious
remedies. The plurality did not adopt either of the strict scrutiny standards but noted the legislation would survive either. 5' It merely upheld
the provision as a valid
means to the accomplishment of Congress' con52
stitutional objectives.
In concurring, Justice Powell first analyzed a district court's discretion to choose race-conscious remedies. He noted: "[Tihis Court has not
required remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress
racial discrimination is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court.' "53
Justice Powell then concluded that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments granted Congress similar discretion."
In contrast, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education5 signalled a further narrowing of the circumstances in which other governmental bodies
can conduct race-conscious relief. In that case, the Court invalidated a
collective bargaining agreement on equal protection grounds. 56 The Jackson Board of Education had agreed not to lay off a greater percentage
of minority teachers than the percentage of minority teachers employed
at the time of any layoff. The agreement resulted in the disproportionate
layoff of white teachers with greater seniority.57
Four justices settled on the Wygant strict scrutiny standard, holding
that a remedial racial classification must be narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling governmental purpose.58 Significantly, the plurality also sug49. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
50. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483. Justice Stewart suggested the opposite. Id.at 527
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated Congress and the federal courts have a "similar
measure of discretion." Id at 508. (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id at 492.
52. Id at 478, 492. Justice Powell joined the plurality but separately upheld the provision as a necessary means to the accomplishment of a compelling governmental interest in
redressing discrimination against minority contractors. Id at 496 (Powell, Jr., concurring).
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld the provision as substantially related
to the important governmental objective of remedying past discrimination. Id at 519 (Bren-

nan, J., concurring in the judgment).

53. Id at 508 (Powell, J. concurring) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 794 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(. The plurality quoted this
language in Paradise, 107 S.Ct. at 1073.
54. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) (5-4 decision).

56. Id at 1846. The Supreme Court has held that under Title VII "a nonminority employee with seniority under the contractually established seniority system (may not be displaced] absent either a finding that the seniority system was adopted with discriminatory

intent or a determination that such a remedy was necessary to make whole a proven victim

of discrimination." Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984).
57. Wygan4 106 S.Ct. at 1845.
58. Id at 1846. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor
adopted this test. Id Justice Scalia subscribed to it in Paradise,107 U.S. at 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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gested that to be narrowly tailored, a remedy must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the objective. 9 The plurality doubted whether
a compelling interest existed in Wygant.6° However, emphasizing how seriously layoffs burden particular individuals,61 it invalidated the agreement
because the Board could have accomplished
its objectives through less
2
intrusive means, such as hiring goals.'
In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v.

EEOC,63 a case quite similar to Paradise,6 the plurality for the first time

applied Wygant strict scrutiny where a district court ordered raceconscious relief. 65 In that case, a district court found Local 28 had violated Title VII by discriminating against nonwhite workers in recruitment,
selection, training, and admission to the union.66 The local systematically disobeyed district court orders to remedy its violations. 7 The district
court twice cited the local for contempt and finally required it to indenture one black apprentice for each white apprentice indentured. 8
The plurality did not resolve the dispute between Wygant strict scrutiny and the Bakke alternative (substantial relation to important governmental objective test). Instead, it held that even under the more rigorous
Wygant standard, the order did not violate the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.65 The plurality found
the government had a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination. The plurality then concluded that the order was narrowly tailored
to fit that compelling interest since the district court had considered the
efficacy of alternative remedies and the order marginally impacted the
interests of white workers."0
In Paradise, the Court addressed a district court order of raceconscious relief to remedy a constitutional and not a statutory violation.7'
In Swann, the Court had concluded that the district courts have broad
discretion to order race-conscious relief. However, the Court later restricted the ability of other governmental bodies to conduct affirmative action.
59. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.6.
60. It rejected the lower court's holding that alleviating societal discrimination was
a compelling interest. Id at 1848. Further, while the Board asserted an interest in remedying prior discrimination, the record lacked convincing evidence such discrimination had existed. The plurality required such evidence before accepting the interest as compelling. Id
61. Id at 1851.
62. Id at 1852.
63. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (5-4 decision).
64. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1074 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3053.
66. Id at 3026 (citing EEOC v. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 401 F.
Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y., 1975)).
67. Id at 3028-30.
68. Id at 3030.
69. Id at 3053. The plurality first held section 706(g) of Title VII does not prohibit
a district court from ordering affirmative race-conscious relief to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. Id at 3035.
70. Id at 3053.
71. See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1075 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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At issue in Paradisewas to what extent these restrictions limited the broad
discretion recognized in Swann."'
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

At the outset, the Supreme Court recognized that district courts may
use racial classifications to remedy unlawful discrimination 3 However,
a majority of the Court again failed to agree on the proper constitutional
standard for such race-conscious remedies./ Instead, as in Sheet Metal
Workers," the plurality held that the order was narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental purpose and thus survived even Wygant strict scrutiny.s Satisfying the first prong of that test, the plurality held that the remedying
of past and present discrimination was a
7
compelling interest.

1

While it did not adopt them as a test, 78 the plurality then considered
four factors to determine whether the order was narrowly tailored. 9 These
included the necessity for relief and efficacy of alternative remedies, the
flexibility and duration of the relief, the relationship of the numerical goals
to the relevant labor market, and the impact of the relief on the rights
of third parties. In this regard, the plurality found that the order was flexible and temporary,8 imposed an acceptable burden on white troopers,"'
72. In Paradise,Justice Powell distinguished the appropriate standard of review in
Swann and other school desegregation cases from that appropriate in Paradiseand other
affirmative action cases. In his view, a lesser standard is proper in the school desegregation
context because the busing of schoolchildren is less burdensome than the denial of hiring
or promotion. Id at 1075 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Stevens adopted
Swann as the applicable standard, stating that the school desegregation cases do not differ
fundamentally from the affirmative action cases. For him, the standard of review derives
from the defendant's status as a proven violator of the Constitution. Id at 1079 n.4 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment). He determined the district court had not abused its wide
discretion in ordering the race-conscious relief, and thus concurred in the judgment. Id at
1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id at 1064.
74. Id.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 3053.
76. Paradise 107 S. Ct. at 1064. Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing that since the order was neither underinclusive nor overinclusive, the "metaphor of narrow tailoring" did not
apply to the facts of the case. Id at 1077 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
77. Id at 1065. Also compelling was the "societal interest in compliance with the judgments of federal courts." Id at 1066.
78. The Court "lookfs] to several factors" including these four in determining whether
an order is narrowly-tailored. Although the order in Paradisesatisfied all four factors, the
Court went on to consider whether the order was within the district court's discretion. The
Court's analysis does not reveal whether a five-factor test, including abuse of discretion,
now exists for narrow tailoring. Id at 1067.
79. Justice Powell first described these factors in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-11 (Powell,
J., concurring).
80. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1071. The order could be waived if no qualified blacks were
available and was in effect only until the Department adopted a valid promotion procedure.
Id. at 1070-71.
81. Id. at 1073. The order, since it did not involve layoffs and did not absolutely bar
whites from being promoted, was less burdensome than a hiring quota. Cf. Wygant 106 S.
Ct. at 1851 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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and that the quota was properly related to the percentage of blacks in
the workforce. 2
Necessity for Relief
The plurality carefully reviewed the district court's objectives and alternatives to determine whether the order was necessary." Unlike the dissenters,'8 the plurality found that the order was intended to eliminate the
effects of the Department's discrimination and delay as well as to compel
the Department to develop a valid promotion procedure.85 After examining the available alternatives in light of these objectives, the Court concluded the order was necessary."8
The plurality held that the Department's one-time offer to immediately promote four blacks and eleven whites would not have achieved the
district court's objectives. That alternative did not ensure that the Department would adopt a valid promotion procedure
or vitiate the effects of
87
the Department's delayed compliance.
The plurality also held that fining the Department would have served
none of the Court's objectives.88 The district court had assessed fees
against the Department before without effect. Further, fines did not address the Department's need to promote fifteen troopers to corporal or
compensate black troopers for the Department's past discrimination.89 In
sum, the Court concluded:" '[Ilt is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any other
effective remedy.' "90 The district court's order thus satisfied four of the
relevant factors in determining whether race-conscious relief is narrowly
tailored.
District Court Discretion
The plurality finished its analysis by discussing the "respect owed
a District Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9' The plurality noted that remedial plans must not always be the least restrictive means of implementation. 2 The plurality also recognized the district court's first-hand experience with the parties"3 and broad equitable powers. The Court then
82. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1071. Since the order could last only until blacks made up
25% of the trooper force, the plurality concluded the 50% quota merely accelerated the speed
at which that permissible goal would be achieved. Id
83. Id at 1067-70.
84. Id at 1080.
85. Id at 1067.
86. Id at 1070.
87. Id at 1068.
88. This alternative was never presented to the district court. Id at 1069.
89. Id
90. Id at 1070 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
91. Id at 1073.

92. Id

93. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 6.
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concluded that Wygant strict scrutiny does not eliminate a district court's
discretion in constructing remedies9"
The Court held the one-for-one promotion order was narrowly tailored
because it was necessary, flexible, and temporary; acceptably burdened
white troopers; and was produced by the "considered judgment of the District Court."" Since it served the compelling objective of remedying past
discrimination, the order was thus valid under the fourteenth amendment. 96
ANALYSIS

Paradiseleft certain matters settled where district courts order raceconscious remedies to constitutional violations. First, the Court reaffirmed
that district courts may order race-conscious relief." Second, the Supreme
Court will apply the more rigorous "narrowly tailored to compelling
governmental interest" test to such orders.9 8 Third, remedying past and
present discrimination is a compelling governmental interest. 9 Fourth,
four factors provide some guidance to the existence of narrow tailoring. 00
Finally, the district courts retain some discretion in framing relief even
under Wygant strict scrutiny."' I
However, the tension between Wygant strict scrutiny and such equitable discretion remains. The different routes Justices Powell and Stevens
took to affirm the one-for-one promotion order exemplify the difference
between the two concepts. Justice Powell stressed the district court was
justified because it had no other effective remedy. 0 2 Further, Justice
Powell joined the plurality because it "most carefully scrutinized the ord10
er.'
In contrast, Justice Stevens likely did not join the plurality because
of this careful scrutiny.'" Justice Stevens considered unprecedented the
suggestion that the Court should apply Wygant strict scrutiny to district
court orders.' 0 He did not discuss any alternatives available in the district court but found simply that the court had not abused its broad discretion "to repair the denial of a constitutional right."'' 0
The Court's use of Wygant strict scrutiny is unnatural because it was
developed to restrict non-judicialbodies from conducting race-conscious
94. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1074.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id. at 1064.
98. In both Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise,supporters of the substantial relation
test applied the more rigorous Wygant test to district court orders. See supra notes 75, 76.
99. Eight justices agree with this; Justice Stevens did not reach the question. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1057, 1065, 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1067, 1075; see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
101. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1074.
102. Id at 1075, 1076 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Id at 1076.
104. See supra note 76.
105. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1077 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. Id at 1079. See supra note 72.
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affirmative action. District courts are in a much better position than regents or school boards to create race-conscious remedies. They are both
authorized to order race-conscious relief and required to find discrimination before acting.'0 7 Thus, district court orders are more likely to be justified by a compelling interest." 8 Further, the regents in Bakke and the
school board in Wygant failed to narrowly tailor programs to their interests. District courts, because of their flexibility, objectivity, and experience with the parties are much more likely to do so. '°9
Nevertheless, the plurality alternated between strict scrutiny and
equitable discretion. On one hand, it stated district courts were not always required to implement the least restrictive remedies ' 0 and paid ample homage to the district court's discretion and experience with the
parties.' For example, the plurality deferred to the district court's choice
of a 50% quota, noting that court knew best what would work and that
the Constitution requires the district court to order the necessary relief."'
On the other hand, the plurality thoroughly reviewed all of the district court's options and simply disagreed with the dissent over whether
any of them could be effective.'1 Paradisedoes not resolve whether the
Court would uphold an order of race-conscious relief where fines or a onetime promotion would be effective. Only in that instance may a district
judge exercise the discretion that Paradiserecognized. The plurality held
a district court must not always use the least restrictive means."'
Nevertheless, by requiring race-conscious remedies to be necessary, and
holding the quota was necessary because no other alternative was effec8
tive,"1
the plurality suggested the district courts' discretion is limited to
ordering remedy after remedy until all fail and it reaches the last resort.
The continuing tension between strict scrutiny and equitable discretion is revealed by the Court's disagreement about "the degree to which
the means employed must 'fit' the ends pursued to meet constitutional
standards.""' 6 Two statements from Paradisereveal this disagreement.
The plaintiff class argued that: "In any event, the district court surely
was not required to employ remedy after remedy before it reasonably could
107. In both Bakke and Wygant school officials failed to find discrimination before beginning affirmative action programs. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309; Wygan 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
108. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. See Id at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 508 (Powell, J., concurringl.
110. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1073.
111. Id at 1072-73.
112. Id at 1072 n.32.
113. The plurality and the dissenters also disagreed over the validity of the one-for-one
promotion quota. The dissenters argued such quotas must more closely relate to the percentage of blacks in the work force. Id. at 1081. The plurality held that since the ultimate goal
equalled the relevant labor force, the 50% quota permissibly represented the speed at which
that goal would be achieved. Id at 1071. The dissenters feared such reasoning could validate 100% quotas. Id at 1081. However, the Court's hostility toward quotas which absolutely barred whites from a position, stated in Bakke and reaffirmed in Paradise,would prevent
such a result. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320; Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1073.
114. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1073.
115. Id at 1070.
116. Wygant 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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conclude that race-conscious relief was warranted."" 7 The dissent countered: "There is simply no justification for the use of racial preferences
if the purpose of the order could be achieved without their use."" 8 Since
the Paradiseplurality accepted both arguments, their effect on affirmative action must be examined.
The dissent exemplifies a wide scope of review which chills raceconscious remedies." 9 The dissenters would have reversed because the district court did not consider alternatives that were not presented to it and
because "[s]urely, some combination of penalties could have been designed
that would have compelled compliance with the consent decrees."

20

Such

a result would discourage plans which "promised
realistically to work, and
2

promiseD realistically to work now. "'1'

First, the prospect of reversal, because some unknown and unpresented less restrictive means was available, would cause district courts
to hesitate before ordering race-conscious remedies. This is particularly
true since in reviewing the district court's purposes, the dissenters concluded that court sought only to compel compliance with the consent
decrees. Thus, while the dissenters required the district court to expressly consider alternatives not presented to it, 2 2 it ignored two objectives

expressly stated in the district court's opinion.1s

Second, this approach would have required the district court to fine
the Department and settle "for yet another promise that [a valid] procedure would be forthcoming 'as soon as possible.' 124 The Department had
already sacrificed a great deal of money to avoid the district court's orders.12 5 Further, the Department had failed for over three years to abide
by the consent decrees. In contrast, it presented a valid promotion procedure six months after the district court's order. 20 Thus, this requirement
would slow the initiation of a workable plan since it would force the district court to rely on remedies which had not worked in the past. 7
Further, district courts generally frame equitable remedies because
2 8 and are thus better
they are familiar with the parties and the situation"
117. Brief for Respondent at 33, United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987 (No.
85-999).
118. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1081 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id at 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White separately dissented having
found the district court exceeded its discretion. Id
120. Id at 1082.
121. Id at 1072 n.31 (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original)).
122. Id at 1082.
123. Id at 1080. The district court also sought to eliminate the effects of the Department's past discrimination and delay in compliance. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72,
74-75 (1983).
124. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1068.
125. Id at 1069 n.24.
126. Id at 1063. See also United States v. Dothard, 373 F.Supp. 504, 506-07 (M.D. Ala.
1973), affd sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1069.
128. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947).
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able to judge the parties' good faith. 129 For instance, in Paradisethe district court had 12 years' experience with the parties before it ordered the
one-to-one promotion quota. It had also noted that race-conscious relief
was more effective than other remedies in dealing with the Alabama
Department of Personnel.' 0 Thus, while the dissenters assumed otherwise, the Alabama District Court probably knew better than the Supreme
Court whether a given remedy would work.
In short, requiring a district court to wait until the last resort postpones the remedying of past discrimination. Further, it eliminates a district court's discretion over when to order race-conscious relief. Since it
is experienced with constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court must discover whether such relief is available (whether a compelling interest is involved). However, because of its day-to-day experience, both with the
parties and with race-conscious remedies, a district court should choose
when such a remedy is appropriate.
The Court should instead focus on the form of a race-conscious remedy.
In reviewing such remedies, the Court should now adopt a four-factor test
based on the factors it has found relevant in several recent cases."' Since
a district court should determine whether a race-conscious remedy is appropriate, the Court should not consider the necessity for relief or efficacy of alternative remedies. Nonetheless, this test will prohibit remedies
which the Court disdains, such as those which merely reflect a racial prefer3 4
3
ence," 2 impose a racial balance," require the firing of white workers,
135
absolutely bar whites from a position, stigmatize minorities by suggesting they are unable to compete equally,3 ' or require the disproportionate
layoff of white workers.3 7
The Court should review the following four factors: First, is a remedy
temporary? A temporary quota is much less likely to impose a racial
balance or absolutely bar some whites from a position. Further, conditioning such relief on the development of nondiscriminatory procedures
encourages violators to obey judicial decrees. Second, is a remedy flexible? A violator will not fire whites to hire minorities if a remedy includes
a waiver in case of bad economic conditions. No stigma of inferiority will
attach to minorities if a district court does not require the hiring of unqualified minorities.
Third, does the district court's ultimate goal match the percentage
of minorities in the labor force? Such a requirement ensures that raceconscious relief does not merely reflect a racial preference. Finally, does
the remedy acceptably burden nonminority workers? This separate inquiry
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299.
Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1059 n.4.
Id. at 1073.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
Wygant 106 U.S. at 1860 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319.
Id at 298.
Wygan4 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
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requires a district court to be sensitive to nonminority interests and to
avoid more burdensome remedies, such as layoff quotas, in favor of less
burdensome remedies, such as hiring goals.
Thus, this four-factor test will enable the Supreme Court to invalidate and the district courts to identify unconstitutional race-conscious
remedies. At the same time, the test will allow district courts to use their
discretion to determine when race-conscious relief is appropriate. In short,
this four-factor test will assure that district courts both "refrain from ordering relief that violates the Constitution, [and] order the relief necessary to cure past violations and to obtain compliance with its mandate"
(emphasis in original). 38
CONCLUSION

In the last few years, the Supreme Court has striven to build a constitutional foundation for district court orders of race-conscious remedies
to constitutional violations. In Paradisethe Court reaffirmed the validity of such remedies and suggested that district courts have broad discretion to order them. Unfortunately, the Court failed to reconcile strict
scrutiny with this broad discretion, and thus the foundation remains incomplete.
The Court should reject the suggestion that a district court may order race-conscious relief only as a last resort. The Court must also provide
a specific test to guide the district courts. Under the proper test, the Court
should first discover whether a compelling state interest is involved. Once
the Court has found a compelling interest, it should allow the district
courts to decide when a remedy is appropriate. The Court should instead
focus on the form of a remedy. It should review a remedy to determine
whether it is flexible, is temporary, has ultimate numerical goals which
mirror the relevant labor force, and acceptably burdens the interests of
nonminority workers. Such a test will adequately protect nonminority interests. Moreover, by applying this test, the Supreme Court will better
guide the district courts in this difficult area, will reconcile strict scrutiny with equitable discretion, and will ensure equal protection for all
persons.
TIMOTHY W. MILLER

138. Paradise,107 S. Ct. at 1072 n.32.
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